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Abstract 
UK workers have been experiencing unprecedented falls in real wages and living 
standards. Taking a balanced view of the available data suggests that since 2008 real 
weekly wages have fallen by around 8 percent, which amounts to a fall in annual 
earnings of about £2000 for the typical (median) worker. Three factors are important 
drivers of these unprecedented real wage falls. First, unemployment has been exerting 
a larger downward pressure on wages than in previous recessions. Second, low wages 
and low business investment have created the conditions for an extremely poor 
productivity record through both the recession and recovery, though this has been 
good news for jobs. Third, and pre-dating the recession, due to rising inequality the 
wages of typical British workers are no longer keeping up with productivity gains 
made in the economy. If sustained increases in real wages are to occur, this requires a 
return to strong productivity growth and a re-coupling of median wages to 
productivity. 
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1. Introduction 
Compared to earlier economic downturns, the deep recession and protracted period of 
economic stagnation that occurred in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 has 
seen different behaviour in the UK labour market. Apart from for those aged under 
25, employment saw only minor falls – by about 2 percent – relative to the sizable 7 
percent fall of GDP that occurred. Employment started to recover alongside output 
and stood at 0.5 million higher than pre-recession levels by the end of 2013, whilst 
output remained a little below peak levels. Again the exception is those aged under 
25, for whom the employment recovery has only just started. This poor output 
performance coupled with strong employment means that productivity remains well 
below peak levels and lies some 15 percent below levels seen at a similar stage after 
previous recessions. This is what has become to be widely been referred to as the 
“productivity puzzle”. 
At the same time as this pattern of relatively strong employment and poor 
productivity performance, the UK has experienced a significant fall in real wages. 
The scale of the real wage falls are historically unprecedented, certainly in the last 
fifty years where broadly comparable records exist (see Taylor et al, 2014). When 
assessed over the range of measures and data available, median real weekly wages 
have fallen by around 8 percent since early 2008. This equates to an annual earnings 
loss of about £2000 in today’s prices. Falls in hourly wages are slightly less marked 
owing to an increased extent of part-time working but the overall impression is 
similar. The most recent data suggests little in the way of reversal as the lack of real 
wage growth has continued through 2013.  
Of course, these patterns are linked. Falling real wages combined with 
difficulty accessing loans from banks for investment have combined to encourage 
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firms to use extra workers rather than new investment in capital to meet demand. 
Business investment fell by 14 percent from 2008 to 2009 and has yet to recover this 
lost ground. Hence, the extraordinarily poor period of flat productivity and the 
(relatively) good picture for employment that has been seen. In turn poor productivity 
performance offers little scope of rises in real wages, thereby completing the circle.   
 Academic research around this subject remains limited. In an earlier paper 
(Gregg et al, 2014) we undertook an initial analysis of whether there may have been a 
structural shift in the evolution of real wages by studying whether one can garner 
evidence of a changing role of unemployment in explaining falling real wages. This, 
alongside related contributions by Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014) and Blundell et al. 
(2014), who respectively explore productivity movements and cyclical shifts in the 
composition of the employed, formed a special session at the 2013 Royal Economic 
Society conference. 
In this paper, we seek to make three new contributions in terms of studying 
what has happened to real wages more recently compared to the previous part of the 
last twenty five years. We first offer a thorough, descriptive analysis exploring 
movements in real wages across various sources of wage information, concepts of pay 
and inflation measures. The aim is to ascertain the robustness of the evidence on 
falling real wages and to generate a better understanding as to why the extent of 
measured falls vary in different settings. We look at different data sources, variations 
across major groups in the workforce and explore in more detail the evidence for 
nominal wage stickiness.  
The second aim is to rehearse what we know about the reasons why real pay 
has been falling. We argue that three factors have been important drivers of these 
unprecedented real wage falls. First, unemployment has been exerting a larger 
4 
 
downward pressure on wages than in previous recessions. Second, median wages 
have historically tracked productivity growth in a mutually reinforcing relationship. 
Productivity gains then create room for rising real wages and rising real wages create 
the incentive for firms to invest in labour saving technologies. Low wages have in 
turn created incentives for firms to meet demand by hiring more workers rather than 
through investment. Hence the weak productivity record, though it has been good 
news for jobs, which has restricted the room for real wage rises. Third, and pre-dating 
the recession, wages of typical British workers have no longer kept up with 
productivity gains made in the economy. This stems from a growing contribution of 
total compensation going towards supporting pensions, not just for current but also 
already retired workers, and because it is the highest paid (the top 1 or 2 percent) who 
have taken a disproportionate share of the gains from productivity leaving little room 
for wage gains by ordinary workers. 
The third contribution of the paper is to offer a consideration of when or if the 
pattern of observed real wage falls could end. This entails a discussion of the scope 
for economic recovery and policy change to be able to reverse the observed declines. 
The extent to which the three reasons we argue caused falls in real wage growth can 
be alleviated is critical to this discussion.   
 
2. Documenting the Rise and Fall of Real Wages in the UK 
To document what has happened to real wages over time, we analyse wage data from 
various sources over the twenty five year time period from 1988 to 2013. The start 
date is determined by the fact that 1988 is the first year where we have Consumer 
Price Inflation (CPI) data. The CPI has become the preferred measure of price 
inflation. It is used as the government’s inflation target which the Bank of England 
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Monetary Policy Committee is required to achieve (see ONS, 2012). So in this paper 
we principally use the CPI as the measure of consumer prices to compute the real 
consumer wage. Where relevant, we also note any pertinent differences from 
considering other alternative price series. 
What do Different Wage Measures Tell us? 
Figure 1 shows real wage movements since 1988 at three points of the wage 
distribution, namely the 10
th
, 50
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles. The Figure uses New Earnings 
Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (NES/ASHE) data and indexes the 
three wage growth series to 0 in 1988, thus showing cumulative growth over time. 
The ASHE series is derived from employer pay records and is widely seen as the most 
accurate wage data available. It is approximately a 1 percent sample of all workers. It 
is also a panel, covering the same population in every year, and we exploit this feature 
later. The data presented is weighted to reflect the level of employment levels and 
patterns seen in the Labour Force Survey.
1
  
The left hand panel of Figure 1 expresses the wage growth series in real terms 
using the CPI and is thus real consumer wages, whilst the right hand panel deflates by 
the GDP deflator and shows real product wages (i.e. the real cost of employing 
workers for firms given the prices they charge for their output). Figure 2 shows 
movements over time in the CPI and the GDP deflator.
2
 Looking over the full period 
shows that the choice of price deflator makes little difference to the overall longer run 
patterns of real wage growth shown in Figure 1, although there are some subtleties 
that arise in different years. For example, between 2001 and 2008 the CPI rose slower 
                                                        
1 The weighting only starts in 1997 and shows somewhat faster earnings growth than is seen in the raw 
unweighted data. It therefore probably paints what one might think of as the most optimistic picture on 
patterns of real wage growth. 
2
 Appendix Table A1 shows annual price inflation for these two measures in the three time periods we 
focus upon, together with the retail price index (RPI), and two more recently available inflation indexes 
(the RPIJ, which covers the same basket of goods as the RPI using a methodology similar to that of the 
CPI, and CPIH, which adds owner occupiers’ housing costs to the CPI). 
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than the GDP deflator and this reversed from 2008. This means that real product 
wage, shown in the right hand panel of Figure 1, shows slower increases between 
2001 and 2008 and smaller falls since when compared to real consumer wages.  
However, the broad picture shown by Figure 1 is of real weekly wages of the 
typical (median) worker rising pretty consistently to around 2003, except for a brief 
period of stagnation through the recession of the early 1990s. This was followed by a 
period of slower wage growth between 2003 and 2008, and very sharp declines after 
this.
3
 By 2003 wages of the typical worker (at the median) reached over 30 percent 
above levels seen in the late 1980s. After slowing from then up to 2008, real wages 
then fell sharply, falling on this measure by 8 percent in just four years, before 
stabilising in 2013 at levels last seen in the early 2000s.  
The Figure also shows that the period from 1988 to 1999 was associated with 
faster growth for high earners (the 90
th
 percentile) and slower growth for lower paid 
workers at the 10
th
 percentile.
4
 Real wages of the lowest paid did fall through the 
recession of the early 1990s, although not by as much in the recent period. From 1999 
the pay of lower wage workers stopped falling further behind median wages, probably 
due the introduction of the UK’s national minimum wage (NMW) even though this 
directly covered only around 5 percent of the workforce (Machin, 2011). The wages 
of the highest paid continued to pull away though until 2008. Since then wages have 
fallen pretty much equally for all groups.   
Table 1 shows the magnitudes of real wage growth in these three sub-periods 
for a range of alternative sources of earnings data and measures of earnings. From 
                                                        
3
 For the longer term evolution of real wages deflated by the retail price index (data on which goes 
back longer in time) see the Figures in Gregg et al (2014). The overall nature of change (of rising real 
wages, followed by a slowdown and then sharp falls is also shown there. Reduced wage growth in the 
slowdown period is more marked for the RPI deflated wages, whilst the 2008-13 falls are similar. 
4
 The observed pattern of rising wage inequality in the UK over the last forty years has been well 
documented - see Machin (2011) for more detail. 
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1988 to 2003, real weekly wages rose at 1.8 percent per annum for the typical 
(median) worker according to the ASHE data used in Figure 1. This eased to 1.5 
percent per annum between 2003 and 2008. After that, a sharp decline set in, of -1.6 
percent a year. One important thing to note, and something we return to later, is that 
the 2003 to 2008 period of slow wage growth occurred in a period of good 
productivity growth and near full employment. The fall in median real wages on the 
CPI measure over the whole 2008-2013 period is 8 percent, or around £2000 for a 
typical worker in today’s prices in the ASHE data (based on 2008 median annual 
earnings in ASHE, final row of Table 1, expressed in today’s prices, based on the CPI 
Index, which is almost exactly £25,000). 
Whilst the ASHE database is widely thought of as the mostly reliable series 
for earnings, it is not the only data source available and is somewhat dated compared 
to other more up to date sources (for example, April 2013 being only just released at 
the time of writing). It also had some revisions to its earnings measures and 
weighting, most notably in 2004/5. Table 1 therefore also shows growth for average 
and median hourly wage growth since 1988 based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS)
5
  
and the ONS Average Weekly Earnings (AWE). The LFS data is based on a survey of 
households rather than employer records and thus may be subject to some reporting 
biases if people are giving a general sense of their earnings rather than referring to 
official records, such as monthly pay slips. However, it also will capture very short-
term jobs which might be missed by the annual ASHE series. The other main ONS 
weekly wage data series, Average Weekly Earnings, which is also employer based, 
but is reported monthly rather than annually and thus is more up to date but only 
average weekly earnings is available.  
                                                        
5
 More precisely, it uses the General Household Survey before 1993 as the LFS did not include wages 
prior to then (see Machin, Murani and Van Reenen, 2014, for more details). 
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These alternative series suggest show similar wage growth prior to 2008 but 
slightly less marked falls since 2008 for median and mean weekly wages than for 
comparable series in ASHE. Compared to the 8 percent ballpark fall in ASHE, the 
falls in real mean and median weekly wages since 2008 range from 4 to 7 percent for 
these alternative series. However, an issue here is that in 2013 cuts to higher rate 
taxation saw high earners shift some of their earnings into the new tax year, from 
April, to attract a lower tax liability. This inflated earnings in the second quarter of the 
year and reduced them in the preceding quarter. Thus there is a noticeable spike in 
monthly data in April 2013 in the Average Weekly Earnings series reported by ONS 
and the second quarter in the LFS data. The data we report for AWE is the three 
monthly average including March and thus this spike is reduced but the LFS numbers 
are materially affected by the treatment of this period. The annual average fall in real 
wages in the LFS data between 2008-13 are larger (by -0.2 to -0.4 percent pa) if an 
average of quarter 1 and 2 for 2013 is used. This implies an extra 1 percent fall in real 
wages over the period in the LFS data.  
On the nuances that follow from considering different wage/earnings 
measures, Table 1 also shows that hourly wages on all measures showed slightly 
faster growth than weekly wages in the period 1988 to 2003. This is because average 
hours of work fell, partly because of increased part-time working in the workforce but 
mostly due to full-time workers cutting back of hours of work as living standards 
rose. The ASHE data also reports annual earnings for workers who stay in the same 
firm through the full year. Here the measured fall in real wages since 2008 is the 
largest among the available sources being down by 10 to 11 percent.  
Hence, considering all the different sources, a balanced picture is of falls 
somewhere in the region of 8 percent over the five years since the onset of the 
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financial crisis, or around £2000 lower for the typical worker.  
The final column of Table 1 shows the latest data available for the different 
real wage series. The ASHE data shows real wages to be broadly flat in the year to 
April 2013. The Labour Force Survey, which is released quarterly, suggests that real 
wages continued falling in the year to quarter 4 of 2013 (we average quarters 3 and 4 
to improve reliability). The ONS Average Weekly Earnings series can be followed up 
until the 3 months to December 2013 also shows continued real wage falls. Thus the 
alternative series to ASHE suggest that real wages continued to fall in 2013, by 
something around 1 percent or £230 per year for median workers). The different 
series tend to show similar trends over extended periods but can differ over 1 year 
comparisons. Thus the latest data would suggest, on balance, that the fall in real 
wages has slowed in 2013 but not yet stopped. 
 
3. The Extent of Falling Real Wages Across Major Groups and Individuals 
Figure 1 showed that the recent real wage falls have occurred across the distribution. 
This is in direct contrast to previous recessions where, if they occurred at all, they 
were confined only to the lowest paid. Next we therefore turn to exploring variation in 
the extent of falls across major groups and also to explore movements for individual 
workers, exploiting the ASHE panel.  
Differences Across Major Groups of Workers 
The picture so far has explored average wage movements among those in 
employment in any period. Figures 3 and 4 therefore start to explore the data to look 
for variations across demographic groups. The Figures start in 1997 so as to show 
weighted series and Figure 3 starts by showing median real wage growth for men and 
women separately. Median wages for women grew somewhat faster than for men 
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prior to 2009. Indeed male real wages showed a slight fall in 2008 ahead of women. 
The fall from peak levels of real wages are substantially smaller for women at 7.5% 
since 2009 compared to 10.7% for men since 2008.  
Figure 4 shows real wage movements for 18 to 24 year olds, 25-29, 30-34, 35-
49, 50-59 and those aged 60+. The older age groups have seen relatively more modest 
falls in real wages in the region of 8 percent from peak levels. The falls for the 
younger age groups amount to real falls of 11 to 14 percent. For workers aged 18-25 
the fall in real wages in the recent period has been so extreme that, in real terms, 
wages are back to levels not seen since 1998. As these are weekly wages they will be 
affected by movements in part-time working, perhaps connected to increased 
educational participation. In addition they are affected by compositional shifts 
associated with sharp falls in youth employment in this period. Yet for the slightly 
older group, those aged 25 to 29, who saw relatively little change in employment and 
education participation levels real wage falls have been around 12% and have taken 
wages back to the level last seen fourteen years ago in 1999. By contrast for older 
workers the falls represent a return to wage levels seen around 2004.   
Real Wage Changes at Individual Level 
We next turn to look at wage movements at the level of the individual by 
exploiting the panel aspect of the ASHE data. Figure 5 shows the extent of variation 
in individual real wages over the period of the major earnings falls, 2009 to 2012, and 
for the prior four year period, 2005 to 2008.  
Our earlier analysis of ASHE showed an 8 percent fall in median weekly 
wages for the workforce as a whole, but when looking at individual pay growth like 
we do in Figure 5, we need people to study the sample who are in employment in both 
periods. Thus, young workers who enter the labour market after 2009 are not 
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included, making those in employment in both periods older in 2012 than the 
workforce as a whole. Likewise workers moving into the workforce by 2012 or 
leaving after 2009 are not included and these are generally lower paid individuals. It 
is normal that as people age we see earnings grow, especially for those aged under 40 
and those retiring at the end of their working lives earn far more than those just 
entering after leaving education. By looking at those in employment in both 2009 and 
2012 we are thus focusing on those on the upward part of the wage trajectory and not 
the wages of those entering and exiting the workforce in these years. Hence it comes 
as no surprise that the real wage falls for those in employment in both years are 
smaller than for the workforce as a whole, with the median wage falling by around 4.5 
percent.  
The Figure shows movements between 2005 and 2008 (left-hand side) and 
2009 to 2012 (right-hand side) for comparison. The sharp shift into negative territory 
is marked with a clear peak in the more recent period at around -5 percent.  There is 
also a very strong spike at -11 percent which would reflect three years of wage 
freezes, given CPI inflation. Despite this positive selection in terms of workers 
employed both in 2009 and 2012, Figure 5 shows that just under 30 percent of 
workers experienced real wage falls of more than 10 percent, and 15 percent of 
workers had falls in excess of 20 percent. There is, however, considerable 
heterogeneity in the nature of real wage growth. In terms of real increases, about 40 
percent of workers had real wage gains and 25 percent experienced real wage gains in 
excess of 10 percent. Between 2005 and 2008, median real wage growth for those in 
employment in both years was just under 7 percent, again showing the effects of 
positive selection. So the turnaround in individual wage growth across the two periods 
is very large. In the earlier period just 30 percent experienced real wage falls and for 
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around 15 percent these falls were more than 10 percent. This picture is essentially the 
same if we focus on those who are employed with the same firm over the three year 
window.  
There has long been discussion of nominal rigidities in pay adjustment. It is 
commonly believed that real wages can fall due to high price inflation, but it is widely 
thought that nominal wages do not fall (see, inter alia, Bewley, 1999). Given the 
recent unprecedented real wage falls of this magnitude over a short window we have 
documented (even for workers staying in the same job), it looks to be quite plausible 
that this stylized fact of the operation of labour markets is being put to the test in the 
recent UK experience. Indeed, looking at individual changes in weekly wages each 
year from 2009 to 2012 we see that around 20 percent of the workforce had nominal 
wage freezes (i.e. their weekly earnings are exactly the same one year on, before 
factoring in inflation). Furthermore a broadly constant fraction – of around 20 percent 
of workers - had nominal wage falls in excess of 1 percent (i.e. they earn less one year 
on than they started with before taking inflation into account). Of course this may 
reflect a number of changes in pay, such as overtime working, bonuses and shorter 
hours of work. If we focus on weekly basic pay, excluding overtime and bonuses, the 
fraction seeing nominal wage falls is around 17 percent in each year.  
Taking this further, Figure 6 shows the distribution of wage growth for each of 
the three years for hourly basic pay, thus excluding overtime and bonuses, for workers 
employed by the same employer at the beginning and end of each annual period. This 
is the tightest measure of earnings available as it excludes variations in pay due to 
more volatile components of earnings (e.g. overtime and bonuses), hours of work or 
job changes. Falls in this measure really do represent nominal wage cuts. Again a 
sizable group, amounting to somewhat over 20 percent of the workforce, experienced 
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nominal wage freezes (defined as wage growth of between -0.5 and +0.5 percent). 
The size of this group actually increases between 2009-2010 and 2011-2012, reaching 
almost 25 per cent in the year to April 2012. A further 14 percent see nominal hourly 
basic wage falls of more than 0.5 percent. This is slightly larger in 2009 to 2010 than 
in the other years, but they are broadly similar. Some 8 to 10 percent in each year 
experience nominal wage cuts of 5 percent or more.  
If we consider workers who are employed by the same employer in all three 
years (about 80 percent of the sample employed in any one of the three years), we 
find that 30 percent have had a nominal wage cut in at least one of the three years. 
Note this is for a measure of pay that strips out changes in hours, overtime and bonus 
payments etc. A smaller group experience nominal wage cuts more than once. 
Further, some 20 percent had a nominal wage cut of at least 5 percent in one of the 
three years. Hence, there is clear evidence that whilst wage freezes are by far the most 
common story explaining real wage falls, nearly one third of workers employed in 
same job for three years saw a nominal wage cut in basic hourly pay in at least one 
year. Thus it appears that nominal downward wage rigidities are breaking down in 
this period of unprecedented cuts in real wages.   
 
4. Why Have Real Wages Fallen? 
As we have already stated, the recent falls in real wages experienced are highly 
unusual for the UK, even through periods of economic crisis. Hence the next obvious 
question is what we can say about why these falls have occurred. Since as far back as 
Victorian times, real wage growth has been broadly in line with productivity growth. 
As we make goods and services of higher value in every hour we work, the more pay 
levels can rise. Rising wages allow for greater consumption of goods produced, thus 
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boosting demand. Further, rising wages encourage firms to boost productivity by 
investing in labour saving technology, creating a virtuous circle.  
In addition to wage-productivity links, it has long been established that the rise 
and fall of unemployment across the economic cycle also influences pay movements. 
Hence to understand the recent real wage falls we might naturally explore how 
sensitive wages are to movements in unemployment, around underlying trend wage 
growth and the relationship between productivity and this underlying level of trend 
wage growth.   
 We consider three (not necessarily mutually exclusive) explanations of what 
have been important drivers of the unprecedented real wage falls. These are: 
i) downward pressure on wages from unemployment; 
ii) the poor productivity record through the recession and recovery; 
iii) the distribution, across major groups of workers, of the returns available 
from productivity gains made in the economy. 
Real Wages and Unemployment 
 Table 2 builds on earlier research we undertook exploring how wages have 
become more sensitive to unemployment in the last decade or so (see Gregg et al, 
2014). It presents ‘wage curves’ based on the ASHE data discussed earlier and is 
regional panel of real median wages (CPI deflated) and unemployment levels.
6
 Panel 
A estimates the sensitivity of wages to unemployment around an underlying trend rate 
of growth in real wages. The unemployment effect here is thus driven by the 
aggregate economic cycle, through the rise and fall in unemployment, and regional 
movements around the UK wide average. Panel B introduces year dummies instead of 
a trend in wage growth. This nets out the aggregate cycle and the estimates are just 
                                                        
6
 See Blanchflower and Oswald (1994, 1995) and Bell et al (2002) on wage curves. 
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derived from regional variation in wages and unemployment movements not the 
aggregate economic cycle.  
We estimated the model over two periods - before 2003 and from 2003 
onwards - to explore the extent of underlying wage growth given by the time trend in 
Panel A and the sensitivity of wages to movements in unemployment. The estimation 
over separate periods allows us to explore whether both underlying wage trends and 
the sensitivity to unemployment have been operating differently over the last decade 
than previously. Column 1 of Panel A suggests that prior to 2003 underlying median 
real wage growth was 0.8 percent per annum, and that this fell to 0.6 percent per 
annum in the second time period (see column 2). Thus a large part of the apparent 
slowdown disappears when we allow for the sensitivity of wages to unemployment 
and for this to change across the two periods. So, in the later period, unemployment 
applies a larger downward pressure on wages (the coefficient on the lagged 
unemployment rate going from -0.066 in the first period, to -0.137 in the second, or a 
statistically significant drop of -0.071. According to this estimate, the magnitude is 
such that a doubling of unemployment from say 4.5 to 9 percent, slightly more than 
actually occurred in the downturn, would lower real wages by 13.7 percent based on 
estimates for the recent period, compared to a little under 7 percent before 2003.
7
  
Such estimates being based on a short period with just one cycle and thus may 
just reflect the correlation in timing between the recent downturn and the unusual fall 
in wages rather than a deeper shift in the sensitivity of wages to unemployment. Thus 
the lower panel includes time dummies for each year rather than trend terms. These 
will pick up the economy wide shift in unemployment and wages in any year and the 
                                                        
7
 Estimating the trend specification for real wages deflated by the GDP deflator rather than the CPI 
produced very similar results. The real wage-unemployment elasticity changes by -0.074 (as compared 
to the CPI based change of -0.071 in Table 2). Of course, the more general year dummies specification 
is identical to that in Panel 2 of Table 2 as it nets out common macroeconomic differences (as the 
inflation measures are at the aggregate level) through inclusion of the year dummies. 
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unemployment terms now only reflect deviations in unemployment and wages at the 
regional level. Thus the estimates are based on regional variations net of the macro-
economy depending on whether regions with larger or smaller shifts in unemployment 
within any year experience smaller or larger movements in real wages in the 
following year. As the results rest only on regional deviations in unemployment and 
some regions are quite small there will be some noise in the data induced by variation 
in sampling that occurs in any survey. Hence the magnitudes of the unemployment 
effects are smaller, but the key point is that we see the same increase in the sensitivity 
of wages on unemployment (the elasticity changing by a statistically significant -
0.036 between the two time periods). Such a model is asking quite a lot of the data 
and that it is robust to being based on regional variations is very reassuring. Thus we 
can be confident that through the recent recession real wages have fallen because of 
an underlying slowdown in real wage growth combined with an increased sensitivity 
to unemployment movements that have applied greater downward pressure than seen 
the past.  
Wages and Productivity 
 Next we turn to what drives the underlying trend growth in wages seen above. 
The relationship between wages and productivity growth has been long established. 
Figure 7 shows the trends in productivity per hour worked and total compensation per 
hour. The latter is a broad measure of total labour costs to firms and includes 
employer NI and pension contributions. This Figure is an updated version of that 
presented in Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013). The Figure is expressed in real terms 
using the GDP deflator and thus reflects real product wages, as this is the most 
appropriate representation for productivity (though, as Figure 2 showed though, this 
difference between producer and consumer prices over the whole period is small). It 
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shows that total labour costs have continued to grow in line with productivity. It is 
thus clear that a part of the pattern of the slowdown in underlying real wage growth 
connects to the poor productivity performance of the UK economy during the 
downturn. The poor productivity record reflects the low levels in business investment 
seen in this period, which fell by 14 percent in the recession and is yet to recover, and 
the suppression effect of unemployment on wages noted above. Thus firms are found 
employing extra workers, as workers priced themselves into work, as their relative 
prices made them more attractive than investment, thus preserving employment and at 
the same time inducing the stagnation in productivity. 
The Distribution of Productivity Gains 
Figure 7 shows no sign of a decoupling of productivity and wages if wage 
costs are measured as total compensation. However, Figure 8 shows two additional 
measures of labour costs based on wages and not on total compensation. The first is 
mean wages per hour. This differs from total compensation in that it does not include 
employer non-wage labour costs, such as pension contributions, but just wages 
received by workers. The second is median instead of mean wages per hour.  
The point that very clearly emerges is that, over the last decade, from around 
2003, average wages started to grow more slowly that productivity. The gap between 
average wages and total compensation per hour suggests that non-wage labour costs, 
mostly pensions, took a growing share of the productivity growth achieved.  
Two further points need to be made here. First, these pension costs are not just 
those for current workers but all contributions to pension funds to meet the costs of 
defined benefit (DB) pension schemes run by firms. So a portion of the non-wage 
labour costs are meeting pensions of already retired workers. Indeed many such DB 
schemes are now closed to new workers (Pension Protection Fund, 2013) so current 
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workers will not see such good deals in the future. Greater longevity and poor stock 
market performance, compared to that expected when such schemes were set up in the 
1950s to 1970s, means these funds required higher employer contributions to avoid 
building up considerable deficits. The other is that low wage workers often do not 
receive the same generosity of pension deals as higher paid workers, inequalities here 
are larger than in wages as a whole. Minhat (2008) suggests that pension 
contributions made by firms on behalf of senior executives in the UK represent 
around 15 percent of their total compensation, a figure supported by a recent 
consultancy report (Lane, Clarke and Peacock Consulting, 2014). This is far higher 
than for typical workers. For instance, the new auto-enrollment system for uncovered 
workers - NEST (National Employment Savings Trust) – that is gradually being 
introduced in the UK has employer contributions of just 3 percent, and even less 
before the scheme is fully functioning in 2018. 
 Importantly, Figure 8 shows that median wages per hour fell behind 
productivity growth far earlier than did the mean, beginning from around the mid-
1990s. Moreover, the gap opened up much faster soon after the turn of the 
millennium. The opening of the gap between mean and median wages is because of 
rising wage inequality. As top earners had faster wage growth that pulled the average 
wage up at a faster rate than the median.  
Of course, rising wage inequality started before 2000 (see Machin, 2011). 
Prior to then higher wage growth for high paid workers was matched by stagnation 
for the lower paid and so from 1979 to the mid to late 1990s, median workers saw pay 
grow broadly in line with productivity. Since then the lower paid have matched the 
middle, probably due to the National Minimum Wage, but higher pay for top earners 
has pulled the average up. Hence it seems that median wages have become de-
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coupled from productivity growth, because of rising inequality meaning a growing 
share of the value from productivity growth being absorbed by pensions and higher 
salaries for top earners.   
 
5. What Scope is There for Renewed Wage Growth? 
Pulling the different pieces of evidence together, we can start a discussion of what it 
may take for broad based real wage growth to re-emerge. The evidence of Table 2 
shows that falling unemployment will lead to higher wage growth for a period. The 
evidence presented suggests that a fall from 8.5 percent unemployment - the peak in 
this cycle - to say 5 percent - the typical level from 1998 to 2008 - will result in real 
wages rising by about 7 percent.  
The estimated wage curve uses a very simple dynamic structure
8
, but suggests 
that wages respond to falling unemployment with a lag of a year or so. So 
unemployment peaked right at the end of 2011 (see Figure 9) and then edged down 
until the Summer of 2013, which would suggest real wages stabilising in 2013. But 
according to the lag structure, real wages will not respond to the strong falls in 
unemployment since the summer of 2013 till the middle or latter half of 2014. 
However, the model suggests though once unemployment has stopped falling for a 
year or so then the rise in real wages will return to the underlying growth rate of just 
above zero. So the wage recovery will only last till a year or so after unemployment 
has stopped falling. Introducing more complex dynamics would suggest that half the 
effect of falling unemployment is felt in the second year after the fall occurs with the 
rest of the effect coming in a diminishing rate in the following 3 years. Thus if 
unemployment is on a sustained downward trend the biggest effects on wages will be 
                                                        
8
 For more variations, and a number of robustness checks, see Gregg et al (2014). 
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felt in years 3 and 4 after unemployment starts a period of steady decline, so from the 
Summer of 2016 if the current downward trend in unemployment continues. Hence 
we should expect real wages to start rising in the second half of 2014 and for growth 
to get stronger until a year or two after the fall in unemployment slows significantly.  
 The second ingredient for a broad based wage recovery and  the essential part 
of a sustained wage recovery is productivity growth. The weak output performance 
and strong employment picture means that productivity is still 4.5 percent below that 
seen at the beginning of the crash. Such a prolonged period of declining productivity 
(with the trough in quarter 4 of 2012) has never been seen before in modern UK 
history. Whilst growth has returned, productivity in the past year has remained 
relatively flat with a small 0.3 per cent fall in 2013 compared to 2012.  
It is essential that we see a return to the levels of 1.5 to 2 percent annual 
productivity growth seen in the decade before the crash, if real wage growth is to 
return on a sustained basis. Part of the extremely poor productivity record reflects low 
wages, as firms have weak incentives to invest in labour saving technology when 
workers are easy to hire and cheap. So falling unemployment should kick start 
investment, as labour becomes scarcer and real wages stop falling investment should 
return and with it productivity. If this does not occur, there can be little hope of a 
sustained wage recovery.  
Moreover, this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a broad and 
sustained wage recovery. Figure 8 shows worrying trends in thus regard. If some of 
the patterns documented there continue, then the combination of rising total employer 
pension contributions and growing wage inequality seen over the last decade before 
the crash could continue to extract all the growth in the size of the pie, leaving little or 
nothing extra for typical workers. Therefore, policy aiming to boost wages (outside of 
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the lowest paid where minimum wages have an effect) needs to focus on boosting 
productivity, producing sustained increases in revenues of company pension schemes 
(e.g. through stock market returns and real interest rates of company and government 
bonds) and addressing the distribution of wage growth not only towards the top 1 
percent of employees (see Bell and van Reenen, 2014, for a good discussion of this 
issue). Generous employer pension contributions for top executives running at around 
15 percent of salary represent a nexus of the issues of pay inequality and pensions 
absorbing the bulk of the gains from productivity.  
  
6. Conclusions 
The UK has been experiencing unprecedented falls in real wages and living standards. 
In this paper we document the nature of these falls, discuss reasons why real wages 
have fallen, and offer a discussion of what might bring back a return to real wage 
growth.  
In terms of documenting the scale of real wage falls, there are a number of 
alternative measures of wages available and indeed measures of inflation. Taking a 
broad view of this evidence suggests that since 2008 real wages have fallen by around 
8 percent (with different measures and sources showing falls in the range of 4 to 11 
percent). This equates to a fall of around £2000 for the typical (median) British 
worker. Real wages falls have been widespread and have occurred right across the 
wage distribution. Moreover, the broad picture from the available data suggests that 
real wages have continued to fall right through 2013.  
The real wages of some groups have been particularly hard hit, most notably 
the young. Those aged 25 to 29 have seen real falls of  12 percent and those aged 18 
to 24 of over 14 percent. Indeed, the fall for those under 25 is so large it has taken real 
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wages back to levels last seen in 1998. In part this may reflect greater part-time 
working whilst extending educational studies, but even among those aged 25 to 29 
(i.e. those past normal age for finishing education) real weekly wages have fallen 
back to levels seen in 1999.  
At the individual level there is considerable variation in size of wage falls. 
Indeed among those who worked through the recession, in work in both 2009 and 
2012, who are a rather select group, some 60 percent experienced saw falls in real 
wages. Further, nearly a third saw real wage falls in excess of 10 percent and one in 
six experienced falls in excess of 20 percent. Moreover, there is also considerable 
evidence of nominal wage cuts. Whilst the bulk of the observed real wage falls stem 
from wage freezes combined with erosion by inflation, around one third of workers 
who were employed by the same firm between 2009 and 2012 experienced a cut in 
nominal hourly basic pay (thus excluding overtime and bonuses) in at least one year 
of the downturn and for one in five workers this cut exceeded 5 percent of basic 
hourly pay. 
The available evidence suggests these unprecedented real wage falls are being 
driven by three factors. First, unemployment is exerting a far larger downward 
pressure on wages than in previous recessions. This can be seen even at the regional 
level when netting out the economy wide rise in unemployment and fall in wages, 
which strongly suggests it is not just a coincidence of timing. Second, median wages 
have historically tracked productivity growth in a mutually reinforcing relationship. 
Productivity gains create room for rising real wages and rising real wages creates the 
incentive for firms to invest in labour saving technologies. Low wages have in turn 
create incentives for firms to meet demand by hiring more workers rather than 
through investment, hence weak productivity record, though it has been good news 
23 
 
for jobs, which has restricted the room for real wage rises. Third, and this pre-dates 
the recession, wages of typical British workers are no longer keeping up with 
productivity gains made in the economy. This stems from a growing contribution of 
total compensation going toward supporting pensions, not just for current but also 
already retired workers, and that the highest paid (top 1 or 2 percent) are taking a 
disproportionate share of the gains from productivity leaving room for few gains by 
ordinary workers.  
These findings set the scene for a discussion of what conditions could bring 
back real wage growth. The recent recent rapid fall in unemployment, since the 
Summer of 2013, should be sufficient to generate real wage rises in the second half of 
2014, as there is a lag of around a year before wages respond to changing labour 
market conditions. Continued falls should lead to a continued wage recovery, but 
alone such gains will stop around two to three years after unemployment stops falling. 
For a sustained wage recovery the economy also needs to generate a return to the 
levels of productivity growth normally seen, but have been notably absent over the 
last six years. As labour gets scarce and more expensive we should expect firms to 
increase investment generating productivity improvements. But even this will not be 
enough for sustained real wage gains to come about unless the distribution of the 
returns from productivity growth can get channelled back to ordinary workers. This 
was the historical norm, but it stopped in the early 2000s – importantly before the 
downturn - with a disproportionate share of productivity gains going to support 
pension commitments and rapidly rising salaries of very highly paid workers.   
  
24 
 
References 
Bell, B.  S. Nickell and G. Quintini (2002) Wage Equations, Wage Curves and All 
That, Labour Economics, 9, 341-360. 
 
Bell, B. and J. Van Reenen (2014) Bankers’ Pay and Extreme Wage Inequality, 
Economic Journal, forthcoming. 
 
Bewley, T. (1999) Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession,  Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Blanchflower, D. and A. Oswald (1994) The Wage Curve, MIT Press. 
 
Blanchflower, D. and A. Oswald (1995) An Introduction to the Wage Curve, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 9, 153-67. 
 
Blundell, R., Crawford, C. and W. Jin (2014) Employment Composition, Hourly 
Wages and the Productivity Puzzle, Economic Journal, forthcoming. 
 
Gregg, P., S. Machin and M. Fernández-Salgado (2014) Real Wages and 
Unemployment in the Big Squeeze, Economic Journal, forthcoming. 
 
Lane, Clarke and Peacock Consulting (2014) LCP FTSE 100 Executive Pension 
Survey 2013. 
  
Machin, S. (2011) Changes in UK Wage Inequality Over the Last Forty Years, in P. 
Gregg and J. Wadsworth (eds.) The Labour Market in Winter, Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Machin, S., S. Murani and J. Van Reenen (2014) Inequality Trends and Assortative 
Mating, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, 
mimeo. 
 
Minhat, M. (2008) The Role of Compensation Consultants in Executive Pay 
Governance, British Accounting Association conference, April. 
 
Office for National Statistics (2012) Consumer Price Indices Technical Manual, 2012 
Edition, ONS.  
 
Pension Protection Fund (2013) The Purple Book: DB Pensions Universe Risk Profile  
 
Pessoa, J. and J. Van Reenen (2013) Wage Growth and Productivity Growth: The 
Myth and Reality of 'Decoupling', Centre for Economic Performance 
Discussion Paper 1246. 
 
Pessoa, J. and J. Van Reenen (2014) The UK Productivity and Jobs Mystery: Does the 
Answer Lie in Labour Market Flexibility?, Economic Journal, forthcoming. 
 
Taylor, C., A.  Jowett and M.  Hardie (2014) An Examination of Falling Real Wages, 
2010-2013, ONS. 
25 
 
Figure 1:  
Real Wage Growth at the 10
th
, 50
th
 and 90
th
 Percentiles, Weekly Wages, 1988-2013 
 
                                     
 
 
Notes: From New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Weekly earnings, CPI deflator (left Figure) and GDP deflator (right Figure).  
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Figure 2: Alternative Price Inflation Measures, 1988-2013 
 
 
 
     Notes: From ONS. Indexed to 1 in 1988. 
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Figure 3: Median Real Weekly Wages for Men and Women, 1997-2013 
 
       Notes: From New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Weekly earnings, CPI deflator. 
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Figure 4: Median Real Weekly Wages by Age Group, 1997-2013 
                                    
 
Notes: From New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Weekly earnings, CPI deflator. 
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   Figure 5: Change in Individual Real Weekly Pay, ASHE 2005 to 2012 
 
   2005 to 2008                          2009 to 2012 
      
 
Notes: From New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Weekly earnings, CPI deflator, for those in employment.at the beginning and at the end of the 
period. 
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Figure 6: Yearly Changes in Nominal Basic Hourly Earnings for Workers in the Same Job, ASHE  
 
                 2009 to 2010                2010 to 2011                2011 to 2012 
       
Notes: From New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. The vertical line denotes changes in CPI. 
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Figure 7: Labour Productivity and Annual Compensation, 1988 to 2012 
 
 
    Notes: From ONS. Indexed to 1 in 1988. 
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Figure 8: Labour Productivity, Annual Compensation, Mean and Median Wages, 1988-2012  
 
 
 
 
    Notes: From ONS and New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Indexed to 1 in 1988. 
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Figure 9: ILO Unemployment Rates, 1988-2013  
 
Notes: Quarterly data from ONS. ILO Unemployment Rates for 16+ (seasonally adjusted). 
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Table 1: The Rise and Fall of Real Wages, 1988 to 2013 
 
Level April 
(or Q2) 
2013  
Real Per 
Annum 
Growth 
1988-2003 
(CPI) 
Real Per 
Annum 
Growth 
2003- 2008 
(CPI) 
Real Per 
Annum 
Growth 
2008- 2013 
(CPI) 
Latest 
Annual 
Growth 
(CPI) 
Average Weekly Earnings 
ONS Average Weekly 
Earnings* 484.00 
2.28 2.03 -1.34 
-0.90 
(3 months 
to Dec) 
ASHE Average Weekly 
Earnings 
511.62 2.26 1.68 -1.70 
-0.24 
(April) 
LFS Average Weekly 
Earnings** 
472.04 1.98 1.50 -1.16 
      -1.44  
(Q3 & Q4) 
ASHE Average Weekly 
Basic Earnings 
485.10 2.57 1.53 -1.44 
-0.24 
(April) 
Median Weekly Earnings 
ASHE Median Weekly 
Earnings 
424.64 1.84 1.53 -1.60 
0.19 
(April) 
LFS Median Weekly 
Earnings 
    392.00 1.78 0.81 -0.74 
-2.10  
(Q3 & Q4) 
ASHE Median Weekly 
Basic Earnings*** 
396.81 2.34 1.47 -1.40 
0.16 
(April) 
Average Hourly Earnings 
ASHE Average Hourly 
Earnings 
14.90 2.67 1.86 -1.22 
-0.34 
(April) 
LFS Average Hourly 
Earnings 
13.39 1.83 1.63 -0.66 
-1.02 
(Q3 & Q4) 
Median Hourly Earnings 
ASHE Median Hourly 
Earnings 
11.70 2.16 1.87 -1.20 
0.56 
(April) 
LFS Median Hourly 
Earnings       10.73 
1.59 1.75 -0.80 
 
 -1.82 
(Q3 & Q4) 
Annual Earnings 
ASHE Average Annual 
Earnings**** 
28230.96  1.96 -2.16 
 
-0.82 
 
ASHE Median Annual 
Earnings 
22790.15  1.39 -1.90 
-0.53  
 
Notes:  
* The figures on ONS Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) from year 1988 to 1999 are ONS backdated 
estimates using information on the Average Earnings Index (AEI) as the ONS Average Weekly 
Earnings series is only available from January 2000. The estimated series is considered to be 
comparable to the published AWE. Yearly changes refer to the month of April for columns 2 and 3 and 
to the average of March to May in column 4. The latest Annual growth refers to average wages for 
October to December of 2012 to October to December of 2013. 
** LFS wages are weighted averages constructed using waves 1 and 5 and refer to the 2
rd
 Quarter 
(April to June) of every year. We use wave 5 from 1993 to 1996, as that is the only wave when wages 
are reported. Prior to 1993 the LFS did not include wages so we used the General Household Survey 
from 1988 to 1992. The latest Annual growth refers to wages for the 3
rd 
and 4
th
 Quarter. 
*** ASHE Basic Earnings includes other payments. It refers to “Real Per Annum Growth from 2005 to 
2008” due to a change in definition in 2005. 
****Annual Earnings are only available in ASHE from 1996 and just represent employees in the same 
job for more than a year. 
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Table 2: 
Regional Median Real Weekly Wages and Unemployment (CPI), 1988-2012 
 
 1988-2002 2003-2012 Change Between 
1988-2002 and 
2003-2012 
 
A. Trend Specification 
 
   
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.013 -0.012 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.021) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.066 -0.137 -0.071 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.023) 
Trend 0.008 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
    
    
Region Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.988 0.965 0.986 
Sample Size 165 110 275 
 
B. Year Dummies Specification 
 
   
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.018 -0.011 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.022 -0.058 -0.036 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.994 0.995 0.996 
Sample Size 165 110 275 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The time varying regional controls are from the Labour 
Force Survey and are  the proportion with a degree, female, young and white in the regional workforce. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Patterns of Change of Different Price Indices, 1988-2013 
 Per Annum Percentage 
Growth 1988-2003 
Per Annum 
Percentage Growth 
2003- 2008 
Per Annum 
Percentage Growth 
2008-2013 
CPI 2.87 2.31 3.08 
RPI 3.66 3.50 2.96 
GDP Deflator 3.07 2.48 2.08 
RPIJ  3.12 2.48 
CPIH   3.04 
 
Notes: Source ONS published figures. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Retail Price Index 
(RPI) are the two main measures of consumer prices produced by ONS. The RPI and CPI measures 
differ in the methodology used for their calculation and also the CPI does not include housing costs for 
owner occupiers. The CPIH and the RPIJ measures aim at overcoming these two differences between 
CPI and RPI: the CPIH includes owner occupiers’ housing costs and is available from 2005; and the 
RPIJ covers the same basket of goods as the RPI using a methodology similar to that of the CPI and is 
available from 1997. The GDP Deflator is the deflator for the Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
